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Abstract
Pattern separation (PS) has been defined as a process of reducing overlap between
similar input patterns to minimize interference amongst stored representations. The
present article describes this putative PS process from the “representationalhierarchical” perspective (R-H), which uses a hierarchical continuum instead of a
cognitive modular processing framework to describe the organisation of the ventral
visual-perirhinal-hippocampal processing stream. Instead of trying to map psychological
constructs onto anatomical modules in the brain, the R-H model suggests that the
function of brain regions depends upon what representations they contain. We begin by
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discussing a main principle of the R-H framework, the resolution of “ambiguity” of lower
level representations via the formation of unique conjunctive representations in higher
level areas, and how this process is remarkably similar to definitions of PS. Work from
several species and experimental approaches suggest that this principle of resolution of
ambiguity via conjunctive representations has considerable explanatory power, leads to
wide possibilities for experimentation, and also some perhaps surprising conclusions.

Introduction
The importance of complex conjunctive representations for the resolution of ambiguity in
lower-level representations is a major focus for our research as well as others. Much
work from several species and experimental approaches suggests that this principle of
resolution of ambiguity via conjunctive representations has considerable explanatory
power, particularly regarding how best to understand the effects of focal brain
dysfunction (e.g., Bussey & Saksida, 2002; Lee et al., 2005a,b; Barense et al., 2005;
Graham et al., 2006; Cowell et al., 2006; Bartko et al., 2007; McTighe et al., 2010;
Cowell et al., 2010a; Barense et al., 2012; Lee & Rudebeck, 2010). We have referred to
this way of thinking about brain organisation as the “representational-hierarchical”
perspective (R-H) (e.g., Bussey & Saksida, 2002; Bussey & Saksida, 2005; Saksida &
Bussey, 2010; Murray, Bussey & Saksida, 2007).

Recently there has been a great deal of interest in a process referred to as “Pattern
Separation” (PS). PS has been defined as “… reducing interference among similar
inputs by using non-overlapping representations…” (e.g., Reagh et al., 2014) and “…the
ability of the network to reduce the overlap between similar input patterns before they
are stored in order to reduce the probability of interference…” (Neunuebel & Knierim,
2014). Clearly the main principle of the R-H framework, the resolution of the “ambiguity”
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of lower level representations, via the formation of unique conjunctive representations in
higher level areas, is a strikingly similar idea to the above conceptions of PS. The
present article is, therefore, aimed at researchers interested in PS, and explores the
question: To the extent that researchers are interested in PS because it results in the
formation of new, interference-reducing representations, what insights into PS might be
offered by considering some of the conclusions resulting from R-H theory?

A quick word about the scope and aims of this opinion piece. R-H theory grew out of an
interest in the functional relevance of processes and representational content in the
brain. That is, what such processes and representational content do for us, in aspects of
cognition such as memory and perception. The way to determine this is through
empirical, causal behavioural experiments that measure cognition. Non-empirical
approaches such as computational modeling have been hugely important in the area of
PS (O’Reilly & McClelland, 1994; Rolls, 1987; 1989; 1990; Treves & Rolls, 1994;
Norman & O’Reilly 2003; Rolls & Kesner, 2006) and indeed, experiments testing the R-H
view have been guided by computational modeling (e.g., Cowell, Bussey, & Saksida,
2006; Bartko et al., 2007; Barense et al., 2012). But we must remember these are
models, and at some point experiments on real brains must be done. Correlational
experimental approaches, particularly electrophysiology, have shed much light on PS at
the cellular and network levels (e.g., Neunuebel & Knierim, 2013, 2016 this issue), and
focus on PS as a specific mechanism involving the transformation of an input
representation to an output representation, in which the output is less correlated than the
input (in line with computational models). However this process is of interest because of
the representations thus formed and in particular their relevance to cognition (usually
memory). Correlational approaches generally do not address this relevance.
Additionally, correlational approaches have largely focussed on the hippocampus,
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whereas a main aim of what follows below is a suggestion that we need to consider
other areas of the brain with respect to PS. Fully understanding any function of the brain
cannot be accomplished by any single method alone, but requires converging,
complementary approaches.

Furthermore, our focus in this article is the relevance to cognition of the result of
processes such as PS, i.e., the representations that are formed from such processes.
We will not, in this review, discuss how these representations are formed. For example,
we will consider that such representations may be housed in the ventral visual stream,
but not, the way the formation of such representations might be related to the receptive
fields of neurons. Comprehensive treatments of such issues, along with the properties of
such representations (e.g., invariance), can be found in other sources such as Rolls
(2016; this issue).
Insofar as PS can be considered to be a process of forming new representations
that help resolve ambiguity, the results of experiments carried out under the auspices of
R-H theory lead us to offer a number of possibly surprising hypotheses about PS,
including:
1. PS is fundamental to many aspects of cognition including perception; it is not just
for memory.
2. PS happens in many cortical regions, not just the hippocampus.
3. PS happens for all stimulus material and not just ‘spatial’ or ‘episodic’ material. It
happens for different types of representations, in the different regions and
different levels throughout the “representational hierarchy”.
4. The dentate gyrus (DG) is unlikely to maintain all levels of representation, and
thus is not a truly domain-general pattern separator.
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5. PS – insofar as this term equates with the formation of interference-reducing
conjunctive representations – may have much wider explanatory power for
understanding the effects of brain dysfunction than previously suspected.

Below we provide a brief history and summary of R-H theory, with special emphasis
on these particular conclusions regarding PS, and then return to these points.

The Representational-Hierarchical model: A brief history and summary

The R-H view was first presented in 1998 (Saksida & Bussey, 1998) and discussed
in a review article in 1999 (Murray & Bussey 1999). Eventually the first modeling and
experimental studies testing the theory were published (Bussey & Saksida, 2002;
Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2002; 2003). Although R-H takes a broad view of cognition,
initial studies focused on visual cognition, and in particular the issue of whether there are
dedicated, anatomically segregated memory (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991) and
perceptual representation (Schacter & Tulving, 1994) systems in the brain. Initial
experimental studies focused on perirhinal cortex (PRh) as a “testing ground” at the
anatomical interface between putative memory and perceptual systems. Other authors
published similar ideas (e.g., Buckley & Gaffan, 1998; Gaffan, 2002) around this time
and since (e.g., Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010; Nadel & Peterson, 2013).
Our approach was to try to understand impairments in visual cognition following focal
brain dysfunction. The prevailing view was that such impairments could be understood in
terms of damage to a processing module specialized for a particular aspect of cognition
(Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Schacter & Tulving, 1994). In contrast to such a modular
view, R-H theory proposed that representations are organized in a hierarchical
continuum and are useful for all aspects of cognition that require them, including
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memory and perceptual discrimination [indeed we initially referred to this idea as the
“Perceptual-Mnemonic/ Feature-Conjunction” model (Bussey & Saksida, 2002)]. Thus,
R-H emphasizes content rather than processing. The strongest version of the view is
that there are no substantive processing differences within these various regions, and
effects of brain dysfunction can be understood entirely on the basis of content (see
Forwood et al., 2012). Although this very strong version of the view is unlikely to be
entirely correct, it is perhaps surprising just how much it has been able to explain,
without having to invoke putative differences in processing.
The basic idea of the R-H view is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. R-H applied to visual cognition (adapted from McTighe et al., 2010). As
representations pass through regions of the visual ventral stream (VVS) and into the
medial temporal lobe, they become increasingly more complex in a hierarchical fashion.
Representations supported by caudal regions represent “features” (e.g. A, B, C and D),
whilst representations supported by more rostral regions represent conjunctions of those
features (eventually leading to a representation at the level of a whole object-level
representation (ABCD) in PRh and spatial and contextual representations in the
hippocampus). The traditional multiple memory systems view suggests that structures
within the medial temporal lobe subserve exclusively (declarative) mnemonic function,
whereas structures in the ventral visual stream are important for, e.g., perceptual
discrimination. In contrast, the representational-hierarchical view suggests that stimulus
representations throughout the ventral-visual-perirhinal-hippocampal stream are useful
for any cognitive function that requires them.

To summarize a few key principles of R-H theory:
1. R-H emphasizes content, rather than process.
2. R-H assumes there is no ‘configural’ or ‘conjunctive’ region of the brain; each
area contains conjunctive representations at different levels of complexity.
3. These conjunctive representations have the property that “the whole is
greater than the sum of the parts” (see Desimone et al., 1984; Gross, 2008;
Baker, Behrmann, & Olson, 2002; Erez et al., 2015; cf Sripati & Olson, 2010).
4. Lesions in particular brain regions disrupt performance on tasks for which the
representation contained within the region are useful – irrespective of what
putative cognitive processing function has been used to label the task. These
labels for tasks usually come out of the implicit or explicit assumption of
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processing modules, which the tasks are designed to tap. R-H proposes
there are no such modules.
5. Higher-level conjunctive representations help to disambiguate the
behavioural significance of lower-level representations. Lower-level
representations of, say, individual visual features are likely to occur across
many objects or situations. Each of these features is therefore likely to be
associated with different outcomes when part of different objects or events,
creating ambiguity. Higher-level, more unique conjunctive representations are
less likely to occur across many objects or events and can therefore help to
disambiguate the individual features.

This last point is critical for explaining the effects of brain dysfunction on cognition,
and where the concept of PS might fit into R-H theory. To illustrate, let’s use our early
experiments on the PRh. Following the standard model of VVS organization (Desimone
& Ungerleider, 1989; Tanaka, 1996; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999), we assumed that the
PRh holds object-level representations, whereas feature-level representations are held
in more caudal regions of the stream (Bussey & Saksida, 2002). The model further
assumed a high degree of specificity of the representations in PRh (the idea that ‘the
whole is greater than the sum of the parts’), an assumption that has now been supported
by electrophysiological and imaging studies (Baker, Behrmann, & Olson, 2002; Erez et
al., 2015). Indeed, other studies have since confirmed the existence of highly specific
complex visual representations throughout the MTL (Quiroga et al., 2005; 2008). These
specific complex conjunctive representations prevent the subject from having to rely only
on simple feature representations (i.e., isolated parts of stimuli) in upstream areas when
solving tasks such as visual discriminations. This is important when individual features
are not sufficient to solve a problem. For example, subjects with damage in PRh are
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impaired on tasks when features reoccur in both rewarded and non-rewarded objects.
Thus complex conjunctive representations resolve feature ambiguity in lower-level
representations – a concept strikingly similar to the notion of PS as “…reducing
interference among similar inputs by using non-overlapping representations…” (e.g.,
Reagh et al., 2014)
We and others have used many different tasks to manipulate feature ambiguity (and
thereby the requirement for PS), including versions of the biconditional discrimination
(Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2002; Barense et al., 2005; Bartko et al., 2007) and
morphing stimuli together to increase similarity (Bussey, Saksida & Murray, 2002;
Barense et al., 2005; Bartko et al., 2007). Figure 2 depicts three conditions of a
concurrent pair-wise discrimination task as an example of the use of biconditional
discrimination and its variants to manipulate feature ambiguity. Each set of
discriminations show bugs comprised of two features: legs and body plan (represented
in Figure 2 using a distinct letter for each feature). When ambiguity is minimal (left
column), the discrimination can be solved based on a single feature alone. For example,
body plan A is always correct, whilst body plan E is never correct. This is true of all
individual body plans and leg configurations. When there is maximum ambiguity (right
column), all individual features are rewarded equally often, but conjunctions of those
features are selectively rewarded. For example, body plan A is rewarded when paired
with leg configuration B but not with leg configuration D, whilst body plan C is rewarded
when presented with leg configuration D, but not when in combination with leg
configuration B. However, the combination of body plan A and leg configuration B is
always rewarded, whilst the conjunction of body plan A and leg configuration D is never
rewarded. Importantly, the combination of individual features into a conjunctive
representation is necessary to solve the task in the maximum, but not the minimum
ambiguity condition.

9

Figure 2. Concurrent object discrimination (adapted from Barense et al., 2005) in which
each stimulus (bug) contains two types of features (legs and body plan). The ambiguity
level can be manipulated by varying the degree to which the discrimination can be
solved using single features alone (e.g. always choose A [body plan with four dots] or C
[body plan with thick stripes] in the minimum condition) or requires the use of
combinations of features (e.g. always choose AB [body plan with four spots and orange
legs] or CD [black body plan and yellow legs] in the maximum ambiguity condition).

10

In addition to these initial explorations, the same basic principles have been used to
explain a number of phenomena; for example:
1. Impairment in pair-wise visual discriminations following PRh damage. The
seemingly contradictory findings that some pair-wise visual discriminations
are impaired following damage to PRh whereas others are not, can be
explained in terms of feature ambiguity (Bussey & Saksida, 2001; Bussey,
Saksida, & Murray, 2003; Barense et al., 2005). Pairwise discriminations that
are highly ambiguous are impaired after PRh damage but if the discrimination
can be solved on the basis of individual features alone then they are not.
These experiments and others showed that damage to a structure that is part
of the putative ‘medial temporal lobe declarative memory system’ (Squire &
Zola-Morgan, 1991) could impair performance on tasks with no overt
declarative mnemonic component, indicating that the prevailing view of nonoverlapping memory versus perceptual representations systems could not be
correct (e.g., Bussey & Saksida, 2002; Lee et al., 2005b; Barense et al.,
2005; Graham et al., 2006; Cowell et al., 2006; Bartko et al., 2007; McTighe
et al., 2010; Cowell et al., 2010a; Barense et al., 2012; Lee & Rudebeck,
2010).
2. Increased susceptibility to interference following PRh damage. The model
predicted that disruption of the representations of high-level conjunctive
representations in PRh would lead the system to be highly susceptible to
interference from lower-level feature representations. This was confirmed
experimentally in rats by Bartko and colleagues (2010) and later shown in
humans with amnesia by Barense and colleagues (2012).
3. Delay-dependent impairments following PRh damage. The model produces
delay-dependent forgetting as a result of interference from stimulus input
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during the delay in a memory task. For example, delay-dependent
impairments after PRh damage result from the lack of conjunctive
representations to resolve the ambiguity of the simpler representations of
lower-level regions that are more likely to be encountered during the delay
(Cowell, Bussey, & Saksida, 2006).
4. False recognition following PRh damage. The above mechanism made the
counterintuitive prediction that impairment in object recognition after PRh
dysfunction may not be due to forgetting per se, but to false recognition (due
to interference), which was confirmed experimentally (McTighe et al., 2010)
and later observed in AD mice and aged rats (Romberg et al., 2012; Burke et
al., 2010) and humans (Yeung et al., 2013).
5. Amnesia may best be understood as a deficit of encoding, consolidation and
retrieval. There is a classic debate over whether the primary deficit in
amnesia is one of encoding (i.e., conversion of incoming information into a
representation in the brain), storage/consolidation, or retrieval (i.e., the ability
to access previously stored information; Butters & Cermak, 1980; Kopelman,
2002; Meudell & Mayes, 1982; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970). R-H
suggests that brain damage can, at least with respect to object recognition,
affect all three (Bartko et al., 2010; Saksida & Bussey, 2010). An object, once
encoded, is represented throughout the VVS. However, damage to medial
temporal lobe regions such as PRh, as occurs in amnesia, affects only part of
the representation of that object. Thus, although the complex conjunctive
representation of the object is compromised, lower-level representations of
the individual features that make up the object remain intact. Damage in
rostral regions therefore affect both encoding and storage because the
complex stimulus representations, normally maintained in rostral regions and
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that are important for the resolution of interference, cannot be formed or
stored. Retrieval is also affected because there is competition between the
remaining feature representations when individual features are shared
between interfering and novel stimuli. Consistent with this interpretation,
temporary dysfunction of PRh impairs object recognition during encoding
(study phase), storage/consolidation (delay phase), or retrieval (test phase)
(Winters et al., 2007; Winters & Bussey, 2005), and similar findings have
been reported in hippocampus (Riedel et al., 1999). Note this account
diverges sharply from the usual approach, which is to understand amnesia as
due to damage to a processing module specialized for a specific type of
cognition (memory).
6. Double dissociations of brain lesions do not force an explanation in terms of
modularity. An extended version of the model showed that the double
dissociations in monkeysʼ visual discrimination performance following lesions
to different regions of the visual hierarchy–usually interpreted as evidence for
the modularity of visual perception and visual memory—could be accounted
for by compromised representations within a hierarchical representational
continuum rather than impairment in a specific type of learning, memory, or
perception (Cowell et al., 2010a; also see Plaut, 1995).
7. The representational hierarchy extends at least as far as the DG of the
hippocampus. The hippocampus is thought to contain higher-level
representations than representations in PRh, consistent with relational,
cognitive map, or episodic views of hippocampus function, and thus might be
thought of as the apex of the representational hierarchy we are considering
(Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). Although our work
has not yet extended to the entorhinal cortex (EC), it seems reasonable to
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speculate that EC supports intermediate-level representations given its
anatomical position connecting the PRh to the hippocampus (i.e. that it
maintains representations that are of greater complexity than those of PRh,
but of lower complexity than those of the hippocampus). This is supported by
recent electrophysiological evidence indicating that lateral EC supports the
processing of information about individual objects and locations based on a
local reference frame (i.e. spatial cues in close physical proximity to the
individual), whilst the grid-cell populated medial EC supports global (distal
spatial cues) reference frames (Neuneubel et al., 2013). Consistent with the
non-modular nature of R-H, the hippocampus was shown to be involved in
perceptual discriminations (Lee et al., 2005b; 2006; 2007; 2008) and other
“non-declarative” tasks (Graham et al., 2006; Chen & Phelps, 1999), as long
as the representation required for the task was higher-level, at the level of
places or contexts. We explained how this view can account for the effects of
hippocampus lesions on “recency memory” in terms of the resolution of object
ambiguity by higher-level hippocampal representations – without having to
assume the hippocampus is a module specialized for processing “recency
memory” (Cowell et al., 2006). Furthermore, we have suggested that
evidence taken to support the existence of “familiarity” or “recollection”
processing modules in the PRh and hippocampus, respectively, may be
equally compatible with the R-H content-based view (Cowell et al., 2010b).

What does any of this have to do with PS?

The relevance of R-H principles to PS is that all of the above and more can be
explained by the formation of highly discriminable representations that resolve
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interference or ambiguity, which is thought to be the function of PS (see definitions
above). This suggests that PS is a rather powerful process that happens in many parts
of the brain, and may be a major player in many aspects of cognition.
It is worth taking a moment to focus on the last point above, the proposal that the
hippocampus is an equal partner with other structures within the representational
hierarchy, in which all structures perform PS. Although the role of many different
structures in PS has been emphasized by Kesner and his colleagues (e.g., Gilbert &
Kesner, 2002;2003; Gilbert, Kesner, & Lee, 2001; Hunsaker & Kesner, 2013), most
computational theories have tended to emphasize the hippocampus—and particularly
the DG—in PS (e.g., Rolls 1989, 1990; Treves & Rolls, 1994; Norman & O’Reilly 2003).
After Marr (1971), these models usually regard the CA3 region of the hippocampus as
an auto-associator that can retrieve full memories from partial cues, thereby making it
essential for retrieval of episodic memories. According to these models, to operate
efficiently and avoid interference, auto-associators require non-overlapping inputs.
Because of its various physiological and anatomical properties, the prime candidate for a
region that could reduce the overlap in inputs to CA3 is DG. However, rather than
assuming that DG is but one region that may contribute to PS of inputs to CA3, these
theories often make the assumption or claim that the hippocampus implements PS
whereas the cortex does not (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Norman, 2010) or indeed that
PS is the fundamental key to understanding the differences in the roles of the
hippocampus versus the cortex in memory (Rolls, 2015). As a consequence, the vast
majority of the work on PS is focused on the hippocampus. Furthermore, a particular
population of hippocampal neurons – the immature adult-born neurons in DG – has been
repeatedly implicated in PS (Gilbert, Kesner, & Lee, 2001; McHugh et al., 2007; Leutgeb
et al., 2007; Bakker et al., 2008; Hunsaker, Rosenberg, & Kesner, 2008; Clelland et al.,
2009; Creer et al., 2010; Sahay et al., 2011; Nakashiba et al., 2012; Tronel et al., 2012;
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Kheirbek et al., 2012; Lee & Solivan, 2010; Bekinschtein et al., 2014; Neunuebel &
Knierim, 2014). Such findings have led to the suggestion that the DG is a universal
pattern separator that is ‘domain agnostic’ (Yassa & Stark 2011; Azab et al., 2014).
However these authors also acknowledge the evidence outlined above that PS happens
in many brain regions and for many cognitive processes, for example in PRh at the level
of objects. What is not clear to us is how the same inputs—e.g., objects—could be
separated twice, once in, say, PRh and then again in the hippocampus. This needs to be
explained. Furthermore, tasks such as those described above designed to test the
necessity of ‘pattern-separated’ conjunctive object representations in PRh are
completely unaffected, or even enhanced, by hippocampus lesions (Saksida et al., 2006;
2007; Kesner et al., 2015), showing that DG cannot be a domain-general pattern
separator.
Furthermore these authors and others discuss DG-mediated PS as being exclusively
for memory. As we have seen, however, ‘pattern-separated’ object-level representations
in PRh are not only important for memory; they are important for perceptual
discrimination, amongst other functions. The view that PS must be ‘for’ a particular
cognitive function follows from the (we believe incorrect) assumption of cognitive
modularity. If one assumes that brain regions are specialized cognitive processing
modules, then the PS that happens there must be ‘for’ that cognitive function and no
other. Thus if one thinks the hippocampus is specialized for memory, then PS in the DG
must be for memory. The R-H view is non-modular, and under this view PS can be for
any cognitive process, not just memory.
Finally, we note that the apparent involvement of adult-born neurons in the DG in PS
presents a challenge to the present view, namely: if PS happens in many regions where
there is no neurogenesis, why are these new neurons necessary for PS only in the DG?
One possibility is that complex, information-rich representations in the hippocampus,
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which in the case of episodic memory or one-trial contextual learning must be learned
extremely rapidly, require the ultra-responsive, highly plastic new neurons in DG. But
this idea is speculative. Furthermore, you may have noticed that we are now suggesting
the possibility of different processing in one specific region of the hierarchy. Perhaps this
is where the strong version of R-H, which claims that all can be explained by content
without invoking differences in process, breaks down.

Concluding thoughts
To recap, the main points arising from this analysis are:
1. PS is fundamental to many aspects of cognition including perception; it is not just
for memory.
2. PS happens in many cortical regions, not just the hippocampus.
3. PS happens for all stimulus material and not just ‘spatial’ or ‘episodic’ material. It
happens for different types of representations, in the different regions and
different levels throughout the hierarchy.
4. The DG is unlikely to maintain all levels of representation, so is not a domain-general
pattern separator.
5. PS – insofar as this term equates with the formation of interference-reducing
conjunctive representations – may have much wider explanatory power for
understanding the effects of brain dysfunction than previously suspected.
Thus, considering PS from within the R-H perspective leads us to think about PS in a
way that diverges from the typical understanding. Moreover, it makes some predictions
and opens up wide possibilities for experimentation beyond the simple discrimination
paradigms that are used in the majority of studies. For example, ‘pattern-separated’
representations in the DG should be important, not just for spatial/contextual memory,
but for spatial/contextual analogues of the many object tasks that have been shown to
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be dependent upon PRh, some of which are mentioned above (e.g., Kesner et al.,
2015).
Consideration of the R-H view of brain organization might also change the way
researchers interpret the results of their studies. The most salient example, perhaps, is
the need to consider the level of representation thought to be housed in the brain region
one is considering. This means that the choice of stimuli used in experiments becomes
critical. For example, if PRh is found not to be involved in PS for locations/places, that
does not mean it is not important for PS at all. It is -- for object-level representations and
stimuli. Similarly, if hippocampal dysfunction does not affect tasks for which object-level
conjunctive representations are necessary (it doesn’t; e.g., Saksida et al.,2006; 2007;
Kesner et al., 2015), that does not mean it is not important for PS. It is -- for locationlevel representations. This principle is as true for PS as is it for any other aspect of
cognition, yet it continues to surprise us how often the assumptions of the cognitive
processing module view lead researchers to think the choice of stimulus material in their
experiments is irrelevant.
As another example, studies have tended to pit against one another tasks or
cognitive abilities that according to R-H theory are underpinned by the same
mechanism: the resolution of ambiguity (or interference) by conjunctive representations.
For example in the area of neurogenesis, some researchers have asked: Does
neurogenesis affect PS (discrimination at the behavioural level) or reduction of
interference in memory? With our PRh work we have shown how the same conjunctive
representations are useful for both discrimination and reduction of interference in
memory. The same can be said of many aspects of cognition – including the persistence
of memory -- as explained above. Consideration of R-H, therefore, might lead
researchers studying PS to frame their questions in a different way.

18

As a final example of the way consideration of R-H theory might lead researchers to
design and interpret their studies differently, consider the case for separate types of PS;
one for memory (reliant on the hippocampus), and another for perceptual discrimination.
Hunsaker and Kesner (2013), for example, emphasize the importance of the ventral
hippocampus in PS for memory of odors, but not perception, citing a study by Kesner et
al. (2011) showing that ventral hippocampus lesions spared pair-wise discrimination of
similar odors, but impaired discrimination of even relatively dissimilar odors when a
delay was imposed. However, as described above, Cowell et al. (2006) showed how
conjunctive representations resolving interference can explain delay-dependent deficits
(and the predictions of that model have been borne out in a number of experiments; e.g.
Barko et al., 2007; McTighe et al., 2010). The representations that do this are neither
exclusively ‘perceptual’, nor ‘mnemonic’; they are useful for all kinds of tasks that we
refer to as tests of ‘perception’, ‘memory’, ‘categorization’, or whatever. Indeed on this
view, we would predict that a lesion that compromised such conjunctive representations
could generate exactly the pattern observed by Kesner et al. (2011): less similarity is
required to produce a deficit when the task is combined with a delay that is also
increasing the load on PS. Therefore from the perspective of R-H, it is not just that
Kesner and colleague’s conclusion that their results indicate ‘mnemonic’ but not
‘perceptual’ PS is unwarranted, it is that it is the wrong question to begin with, assuming
as it does separate perceptual and mnemonic modules in the brain. However given that
assumption, these authors approached it experimentally in the right way – by using tasks
thought to tap these different assumed systems; often the conclusion that the, say,
hippocampus is involved in pattern separation for memory only, comes from nothing
more than the assumption that the hippocampus does memory and nothing else (which
we believe to be incorrect (Lee et al., 2005ab; Zeidman, Mullally, & Maguire, 2014).
Furthermore the foregoing analysis underscores the need for evidence for PS to come
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from several levels of discriminability in a task where all other factors (such as delay) are
held constant, and an interaction between group and discriminability obtained. Many
studies on PS have not met this basic requirement, using on a single level of
discriminability. Kesner et al. (2011) used four levels in the delay task. However all
separations were impaired, thus providing little evidence for a role for the hippocampus
in odor PS.
As a final comment, our work has focused almost exclusively on vision and the
hierarchical organization of the VVS leading into the PRh and through to the
hippocampus, but it is almost certainly the case that all of these considerations extend to
modalities other than vision., Modalities begin to converge in the PRh; indeed there is
some evidence for impaired tactile PS following lesions in this region (Ramos, 2014).
However, representations in many unimodal areas are likely to be organized in this way,
and the principles of conjunctive representations/ambiguity and PS would therefore
apply equally to these other modalities. For example, the dorsal and ventral auditory
processing streams appear to be hierarchically organised (Warren, Wise, & Warren,
2005; Rauschecker & Scott, 2009): the representations of specific speech sounds are
encoded in posterior regions such as mid superior temporal gyrus (STG), whilst
representations of the meaning of speech are represented in more anterior parts of the
STG (Rauschecker & Scott, 2009). PS – as defined above --may be happening
throughout many brain systems.
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